Ukrainian Constitutional Court Ends the Orange Revolution

The Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled on Friday against the amendments of 2004, which were dividing the powers in the country between the presidency and the parliament.

The Court’s decision is motivated by the economic crisis, which needs a strong hand to make tough decisions.

The opposition led by Yulia Timoshenko on the other hand considers that this is going to give the incumbent president the powers to carry on his agenda, which includes allaying Ukraine from Europe and tightening the relation with Russia, and the promotion of Russian language, spoken by half of the population of the country as a second language of the last (or one of the two languages).

By this ruling the Court is returning the country on the path of the Constitution of 1996, which granted large powers to the president.

It would seem like Ukraine is trying to find its way back after some six years of Orange Revolution under the rule of President Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko ended in the elections earlier this year, when the former gathered 6 percent of the popular approval and the latter was defeated in the second round and had to acknowledge her defeat to Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian leader of the Party of Regions.

In 2004 Eastern Europe entered some “orange era,” with President Yushcenko winning the election on behalf of some pro-Western coalition, with Romanian President Traian Basescu winning in Romania under the populist slogan “May You Live Well!” and the Georgian President Saakasvili who won over the former President Sevardnadze, the last of Soviet Foreign Ministers.

All three leaders were considered charismatic, and were expected by the people as “Redeemers,” those who would replace the acting corrupted regimes in each of their countries.

Romania was taking its first steps toward integration into the European Union special club and was no direct preoccupation of Russia, even though it was nearby of what Russia calls “proximate vicinity.” Russia was more concerned of Romania joining NATO, which would have brought the pan-European organization’s borders far closer to its own.

With Georgia, Russia had some territorial disputes over the breakaway republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which it settled anyway by the military invasion in 2008, when it occupied Georgia in about 48 hours, driving Saakashvili to the brink of suicide.

Ukraine on the other hand is a different business. Russia considers Ukraine as its natural territory, at least the Eastern part of it. (The first Russian state was called the Kievan Russia, with the capital city in Kiev, now the capital of Russia.)

Under the circumstances, Russia considered Ukraine a very close vicinity and did not make it a secret, especially by supporting the breakaway movements of the Russians living inside the borders of this country (very many in the Eastern part, 17% of the general population of the country).

Russia keeps Ukraine addicted economically especially in regard to the natural resources, gas, electricity, and so on. On the other hand, it has been able to impose a contract by which the military navy of Russia could station in the Ukranian harbor of Sevastopol.

Under these circumstances came along Viktor Yushchenko with his promise to give the Ukrainians back their dignity and their place in Europe, prosperity and so on.

Ukrainians believed him, as Romanians believed their Traian Basescu, and elected Yushchenko as the president, ending a era of corruption and nationalism under Leonid Kuchma.

The elections didn’t come without problems. Yushchenko contended with the incumbent PM Viktor Yanukovych, which did not acknowledge his defeat so easily and did not recognize Yushchenko as a president.

The Ukrainians took to the streets, where they remained for almost a month, supporting their President-elect. It was probably the most genuine and democratic thing Ukraine had ever seen in its decennial existence (Ukraine exists as an independent state since 1991, when it broke away from the Soviet Union).

In the end, Ukranians had their way, and the Orange Revolution prevailed. On this occasion some amendments were voted on December 8, 2004 distributing the power between parliament and the presidency in such a way that the democracy may find its way in this country. These amendments were deemed as the success of the Orange Revolution, and a great victory for the democratic party.

What happened is common to all Eastern European Revolutions: the Ukrainian regime sunk under the pressure of huge corruption, and a very uninspired policy. Russia may have played its part in it. The fact is that by 2010 Yushchenko had forfeited his approval of the people, who were bitterly disappointed in their own president.

Some analysts consider that what happened to Yushchenko was a demonstration of the Andropov doctrine, set forth by the Soviet president in the 1980s. His doctrine, intended for the struggles within the unique party, maintained that if you want to discredit your opponent, you let him be voted into office and then let him destroy his own credibility (give him a hand, if need be).

Somehow that is what happened to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. In 2010 Ukrainians had to choose between continuing with the Yushchenko-Timoshenko political couple or to entrust the country to their opponent Viktor Yanukovych.

After winning the elections, many analysts consider Russia succeeded in Ukraine by the most peaceful and democratic way what they had to achieve by tanks and helicopters in Georgia and in other “frozen conflicts.”

The new president advocates a larger regional autonomy, which in a country like Ukraine is very problematic, given that this country is made of many ethnic groups, and of territories ascribed to them by the former Soviet Union.

Ukraine is composed of regions populated by Polish people, by Slovak people, by Romanian people, by Tatars and so on. Not to mention that east of Dnieper River, the population is in majority Russian.

Yanukovych ended the long-standing conflicts with Moscow, among other precautions on that direction prolonging the treaty with Russia on the staying of the military navy in Sevastopol. And that is not all. Russia may open other military bases on Ukrainian territory.